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Self-perception theory suggests that premenstrual syndrome (PMS) may arise from the
misattribution of hormone-induced bodily changes. If so, individual differences in the role of
bodily responses in emotional feelings, measured in a separate expression-manipulation proce-
dure, should be related to susceptibility to PMS. In Study 1, women responsive to cues from
their bodies showed significant mood changes, both negative and positive, with their cycle, over
a 60 day span; whereas women relatively unresponsive to personal, bodily cues showed no con-
sistent cycle effects. PMS was also predicted by a measure of emotional complexity. In Study 2
women whose moods were based on bodily cues also rated their moods as less positive if they
were in their premenstrual week, and women unresponsive to their bodies were unaffected by
their cycle. A reminder of their cycle-stage prevented PMS in the body cue group, which is a
kind of discounting effect. Women who were unresponsive to their bodies also did not show
PMS, and were unaffected by the reminder.
During their premenstrual week, many women experience
negative mood changes: They report suffering from affective
lability, persistent anger or irritability, anxiety, tension, a
lack of energy, and so on. This phenomenon is generally re-
ferred to as Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS).1 Although PMS
seems to have a biological basis, its causes remain obscure
(Gitlin & Pasnau, 1989; Mortola, 1998) and cultural and indi-
vidual expectations also play a role (e.g., Olasov & Jackson,
1987; Ruble, 1977; Walker, 1995). Self-perception theory
provides an account of how these two kinds of factors may be
integrated, as its basic premise is that emotional feelings
arise from interpretations of bodily states, interpretations that
can vary across individuals, and probably cultures. This arti-
cle describes two studies that tested predictions from a
self-perception explanation of PMS.
PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME
According to Simon (1978), Hippocrates and Galen
postulated an association between the menstrual cycle and
affective and behavioral disturbances millennia ago. How-
ever, Frank (1931) seems to have been the first researcher to
systematically describe the negative mood changes that oc-
cur 7 to 10 days before the onset of menstruation (Logue &
Moos, 1986). Since then, considerable research effort has ex-
plored mood variations over the menstrual cycle, but investi-
gators still have not agreed on an explanation for PMS, and
some people express doubt that PMS even exists (McFarlane
& Williams, 1990).
One problem with the diagnosis and treatment of PMS is
confusion about what constitutes PMS. More than 150 dif-
ferent symptoms have been reported to be correlated with
the menstrual cycle (Hamilton, Parry, Alagna, Blumenthal,
& Herz, 1984). These symptoms include both emotional
and other feeling states and various physical symptoms,
such as lack of energy, headaches, breast tenderness or
swelling, and a sensation of bloating. Adding to the confu-
sion, the impact of menstrual cycle seems to vary widely
among women.
In this article we focus on the emotional changes that
may be associated with the menstrual cycle. These usually
are thought to include some or all of anxiety, irritability,
depression, or tension. Logue and Moos (1986) found that
in retrospective reports, about 40% of women describe mild
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1The name Premenstrual Syndrome implies a more severe problem than
most women encounter, and the term premenstrual tension would seem
more appropriate, if a bit too narrow, because tension is only one symp-
tom. However, common usage is to refer to cycle-related emotional
changes as PMS and we will follow that custom.
to moderate such symptoms, and 2% to 10% describe se-
vere symptoms. Other estimates range around these num-
bers, suggesting that PMS is common but by no means
universal. We are primarily concerned with the moderate
range of symptoms that do not reach the level of potential
psychological disorder. We will refer to these moderate ef-
fects of menstrual cycle on mood variables as PMS, but do
not intend to imply by that label that these effects are in any
sense abnormal, nor that they require treatment.
Traditionally, PMS effects have been presumed to occur
approximately 7 days prior to the onset of menstruation
(Rubinow, Roy-Byrne, Hoban, Gold, & Post, 1984). Nu-
merous biological etiologies of PMS have been proposed,
most of which focus on hormonal variations. McFarlane
and Williams (1990) list no less than 19 examples of pro-
posed medical etiologies. The two hormones most often
implicated in PMS are progesterone and estrogen, both of
which ordinarily are relatively high at the beginning of the
premenstrual week, and drop rapidly through the week.
However, their role in PMS, if any, is certainly unclear
(Mortola, 1998). For example, some studies have found
that women who suffer from PMS have chronically lower
levels of progesterone (e.g., Trunell, Turner, & Keye,
1988), an observation that is consistent with the rapid fall
in levels during the premenstrual week. However, suppress-
ing normal ovarian function and hence reducing progester-
one and estradiol levels led to improvement of symptoms in
one study (Schmidt, Nieman, Danaceau, Adams, &
Rubinow, 1998), and when progesterone or estradiol levels
were restored experimentally, PMS symptoms reoccurred.
Women who were not prone to PMS and who received the
same hormonal treatment did not experience any alterations
in mood and physical symptoms. Schmidt et al. (1998) con-
cluded that “normal plasma concentrations of gonadal ste-
roids can trigger an abnormal response—deterioration in
mood state—in susceptible women” (p. 216). The diffi-
culty, of course, lies in determining what exactly makes
some women more susceptible to PMS.
Partly inspired by the inconsistent evidence for biologi-
cal factors, an alternative approach to PMS has explored
the role of expectations and social roles. Both women and
men have beliefs about menstruation and associated mood
changes, and these beliefs might produce some of the ef-
fects. For example, when participants in one study (Koeske
& Koeske, 1975) were asked to describe the causes for the
mood state of a hypothetical, premenstrual woman, biology
was used to explain negative, but not positive, moods. Sim-
ilarly, Bains and Slade (1988) found that negative moods in
the premenstrual week were attributed to the menstrual cy-
cle, whereas positive moods occurring during the
premenstrual week were attributed to environmental or per-
sonality factors. These expectations apparently affect
women themselves. When women who were about to enter
their premenstrual week were led to believe that they were
in fact premenstrual, they reported more symptoms than
when they believed they were not yet premenstrual (Ruble,
1977). However, although expectations affect PMS, when
both expectations and actual stage in the menstrual cycle
are examined, both affect women’s symptoms (Klebanov &
Jemmott, 1992; Olasov & Jackson, 1987).
Based on evidence like that sketched here, various au-
thors (e.g., Blumenthal & Nadelson, 1988; Logue & Moos,
1986; McFarlane & Williams, 1990; Trunell, White,
Pedersen, & Keye, 1989; Walker, 1995) have concluded
that both biological factors and psychological–sociocultural
factors have to be taken into account to fully explain the
phenomena of PMS. Generally, we might assume that PMS
depends on both the occurrence of some physical changes,
and a particular pattern of response and interpretation of the
physical changes.
SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY
The self-perception theory of emotion seems a good candi-
date source for an explanation of PMS, because it is directed
precisely at describing how bodily activities and states gen-
erate emotional feelings. Self-perception theory (Bem, 1972;
James, 1890; Laird, 1974; Ryle, 1949) holds that in knowing
anything about ourselves, we are essentially in the same posi-
tion as an outside observer who infers our psychological
states from observing our actions. In this view, anything we
know or feel about ourselves must be derived from our be-
havior and bodily states and the context in which they occur.
In other words, feelings are the consequences of situated be-
haviors (and are not the causes of those behaviors): We feel
happy because we smile, and angry because we clench our
fists.2 Another way of describing self-perception theory’s
main point is that it is a description of what emotional feel-
ings are feelings of. Just as the feeling of hunger arises from
sensory information about stomach contractions and levels
of blood sugar, emotional feelings are presumed to arise from
proprioceptive information about the activities of muscles
involved in expressive behavior, and the sensations arising
from increased levels of autonomic activity. Note that the fo-
cus of the theory is on the actual, everyday feelings of emo-
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2Perhaps because, as James (1884) pointed out, self-perception theory di-
rectly contradicts common sense, many conceptual objections to it are often
raised, such as the fact that it doesn’t explain the origin of the behavior such as a
smile that leads to a feeling of happiness, or that it seems to imply a greater de-
gree of consciousness than is warranted, or that the size of the experimental ef-
fects are inadequate to explain intense emotions. We don’t have space to con-
sider those questions here but they have been discussed in various earlier
articles (e.g., Laird & Bresler, 1990, 1992). Briefly, the behaviors are assumed
to be automatically produced, like keeping one’s balance, the processes that
lead from behaviors to feelings are entirely nonconscious, much like the per-
ceptual processes that generate the experience of depth, and the effect sizes are
adequate, especially because different kinds of cues may combine to produce
more intense experiences (Flack, Laird, & Cavallaro, 1999).
tions we all know so well, and how these feelings arise.
Self-perception theory does not seek to redefine the nature of
feelings, but to explain the feelings we all experience.
Consistent with self-perception theory, numerous studies
(see reviews by Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Capella, 1993;
Izard, 1990; Laird & Bresler, 1990) have demonstrated that
mood states can be induced by changes in people’s bodily
activities. In these studies, the behaviors necessarily pre-
cede and produce the feelings. For example, people who
are induced to adopt facial expressions or postures of vari-
ous emotions feel the corresponding emotions (Duclos et
al., 1989), and people feel romantic attraction if they ex-
change mutual gazes (Kellerman, Lewis, & Laird, 1989;
Williams & Kleinke, 1993). Autonomic arousal plays a
similar role to expressive behavior. For example, increases
in arousal lead to increased intensity of experiences of fear,
anger, and passionate love (see Laird & Bresler, 1992; &
Foster, Witcher, Campbell, & Green, 1998, for reviews). A
lesser but still substantial number of studies has shown that
preventing emotional behavior reduces the intensity of
emotional experience (e.g., Duncan & Laird, 1980;
Hazaleus & Deffenbacher, 1986; Laird et al., 1994).
In all the experiments of this type, a kind of “emotional
illusion” is created, in which people misunderstand the ori-
gins of their behavior. For example, a smile or a sad pos-
ture that were adopted in response to an experimenter’s
request, or arousal produced by exercise are interpreted by
the participants as representing their own emotional states
(Zillman, 1983; Foster et al., 1998), and lead to the appro-
priate emotional experience. The converse effect also oc-
curs: If expressions or arousal that were produced by an
emotional stimulus are attributed to some neutral source,
the emotional feeling is reduced or prevented.
In self-perception theory, the perception analogy is
meant to be taken seriously. The process seems most simi-
lar to complex object perception, such as visual depth per-
ception. In both cases there are underlying cues that can
generate the experience, such as linear perspective or reti-
nal disparity in depth perception, or proprioceptive cues
from expressive behavior, or sympathetic arousal in emo-
tional feelings. These cues combine to produce the experi-
ence, although the individual is ordinarily not aware of
either the cues or the process by which the cues lead to the
final experience, whether it is an experience of depth or af-
fective feeling (Laird & Bresler, 1992). In addition, just as
understanding the cues and processes of depth perception
does not imply that the experience is any less real, self-per-
ception approaches to emotion assume that the object of
their study is ordinary emotion, as felt by everyone in their
everyday lives.
Adopting or inhibiting emotional behaviors does not af-
fect the feelings of all individuals equally, however. For ex-
ample, when participants’ facial expressions are
manipulated into smiles or frowns, some participants report
feeling happy or angry, but others do not (Laird & Crosby,
1974). This difference in response reflects broad
differences in the kinds of cues that individuals use in con-
structing their emotional experiences, and other feelings,
and these differences are consistent across a wide range of
cues and feelings, and are stable over time (Bresler &
Laird, 1983; Laird & Crosby, 1974). One kind of cue has
been called “self-produced” (Laird & Berglas, 1975), al-
though perhaps a better label would be “personal.” Personal
cues include a person’s behaviors and actions and his or her
appearance. People who are more responsive to personal
cues are those who feel happy when smiling, sad when sit-
ting in a slumped posture, and so on. Other people, how-
ever, seem to be relatively unresponsive to their own
behavior; and instead, derive their feelings from interpreta-
tions of the situations that they find themselves in. Cues of
this sort have been called “situational,” and consist of our
understandings about how most people in a particular situa-
tion would be expected to feel.
Most of the time in everyday life the two kinds of cues
are consistent—we laugh at parties and scowl in response
to insults. However, in some cases the two kinds of cues
are discrepant, as when people are not laughing and talking
animatedly at a party. If asked at that moment whether they
were having a good time, people responsive to personal
cues might say no, whereas those responsive to situational
cues might respond to the common expectancy that people
at parties are having a good time, and report that they were
indeed enjoying themselves.
Various studies show that only participants who depend
more on personal cues respond to experimental variations
of expressive behavior, arousal, and action. Most com-
monly, response to personal cues has been assessed by ask-
ing participants to adopt facial expressions, and to report
their feelings. People who report feeling happy when smil-
ing and angry when frowning are identified as responsive
to personal cues. They are then found, repeatedly, to be re-
sponsive to manipulations of other, different kinds of per-
sonal cues. For example, only participants who have been
independently identified in the expression manipulation
procedure as responsive to personal cues also report
changes in feelings after manipulations of postures (Duclos
et al., 1989) and gaze (Kellerman et al., 1989). Effects of
expression-induced emotions on memory (Laird, Wagener,
Halal, & Szedga, 1982; Schnall & Laird, 1999) and effects
of misattribution of arousal on feelings of fear (Duncan &
Laird, 1980) only occur for personal cue responders. People
more responsive to personal cues also change their attitudes
to match their speeches in induced-compliance procedures
(Duncan & Laird, 1977; Rhodewalt & Comer, 1979),
whereas those more responsive to situational cues change
in response to a conformity procedure (Comer, 1975) and
are more easily influenced by normative statements about
how they should expect to feel (Kellerman & Laird, 1982;
see Laird & Bresler, 1992 for a review of numerous other
such studies).
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In sum, self-perception research has demonstrated that
the emotional feelings of many, although not all, people are
a result of their bodily states and activities.
PMS AND SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY
As a woman progresses through her menstrual cycle, she
may be in a similar situation to participants in self-perception
experiments. That is, because of the hormonal changes asso-
ciated with her cycle, her body may be producing behaviors
and sensations that are like those of an emotional state, al-
though no emotion-eliciting stimuli are present. However, if
she misattributes these bodily sensations, she will experience
emotions that have no external emotional cause. Thus, the
woman may feel specific emotions in her premenstrual phase
as the result of a misattribution process, just as, in an experi-
ment, she might experience an emotional feeling because she
has been induced to adopt a facial expression.3 However,
only women who are more responsive to personal cues
would show a greater potential for this misattribution and the
resulting PMS. In our first study, we examined directly the
occurrence of PMS in individual women, and later obtained a
measure of their response to personal cues.
STUDY 1
A considerable amount of research has demonstrated that
women are not completely reliable reporters about their sus-
ceptibility to PMS (e.g., McFarlane & Williams, 1990).
Logue and Moos (1986) noted that in retrospective studies,
where women are asked to describe symptoms from one or
more past menstrual cycles, women tend to overestimate
symptom prevalence in comparison with prospective studies.
Consequently, asking women to rate symptoms concurrently
as they are experienced during the menstrual cycle is the
preferable method, especially when the purpose of this study
is not made obvious to the participants (Rubinow &
Roy-Byrne, 1984). To obtain reliable data in a longitudinal
study of PMS, a time period of at least 2 months has to be
covered (Blumenthal & Nadelson, 1988).
In this study, for 2 months women reported, every day,
their mood and answered some health and activity ques-
tions that included whether they were menstruating. We
predicted that women who were more responsive to per-
sonal cues would be more likely to experience cycle-related
mood changes than women who were unresponsive to per-
sonal cues.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited by electronic mail with a brief de-
scription of this study. In the beginning of the study 25 fe-
male college students agreed to participate. However, over
the course of the experiment, 10 participants either dropped
out or had unusable data due to irregular menstrual cycles.
The data of 15 women were analyzed.
Procedure
The women volunteers were told that they were participating
in a study on daily mood variations in relation to external
stimuli. Each woman was asked to come to the laboratory to
fill out an initial questionnaire that contained questions con-
cerning eating and exercise habits, health, and whether the
woman was taking oral contraceptives. Then she was asked
to start the daily questionnaire, which she received by e-mail,
and to send it back each day by e-mail to the experimenter.
The daily questionnaire consisted of questions asking how
healthy the woman was feeling, how well she had slept and
eaten, and whether she exercised. Embedded among these
questions was one asking whether the woman was menstru-
ating that day.
Following the health questions was an emotional rating
scale with the adjectives angry, confused, happy, anxious,
sad, depressed, energetic, and irritable. The instructions
emphasized that it was important to describe the general
mood of the day, rather than how the woman was feeling at
that very moment. All questions were answered on a scale
ranging from 1 (not angry at all) to 10 (very angry), with 1
being the lowest and 10 being the highest score. Each
woman filled out a questionnaire every day for 2 months,
or slightly longer if she had not yet completed two men-
strual cycles.
Using e-mail accounts ensured that these participants
answered the questions daily, because the time and day of
sending back the message to the experimenter was re-
corded. Three women elected, instead, to complete this
study using paper questionnaires. Those participants were
given 14 questionnaires every 2 weeks, and the completed
questionnaires were picked up regularly by the experi-
menter. The experimenter also contacted these women fre-
quently to make sure they were filling out the
questionnaires each day. Prior to vacations, women who
were responding on e-mail were given paper questionnaires
to use for the duration of the vacation if a computer was not
accessible. If at any time a participant failed to respond on
a given day, she was asked to fill out a questionnaire for the
missed day the next day. These day old responses were ex-
amined at the conclusion of the study, but did not appear to
differ from the other responses. If more than 1 day elapsed,
218 SCHNALL, ABRAHAMSON, LAIRD
3The specific mechanisms by which hormonal changes affect the body
and lead to emotional changes is unclear. Of course, as we discussed previ-
ously, the critical hormonal changes have not yet been identified, or even
which hormones are important, so any attempt at describing a mechanism
would be highly speculative.
the participants were asked to leave those days out. The ex-
perimenter contacted the participants frequently to answer
any questions and to hold the participants’ interest in this
study. Of the 3 women who used the paper and pencil re-
sponse format, 2 showed evidence of PMS, and 1 did not.
After each woman had provided data for 2 months, she
was once again contacted and asked to come into the lab
for the Undisguised Expression Manipulation Procedure. In
past research, to test for individual differences in response
to personal versus situational cues, participants’ faces were
manipulated into smile and frown expressions, and their
subsequent feelings assessed. In many earlier studies this
procedure was carefully disguised to ensure that partici-
pants were not responding to expectations rather than the
expressions. More recently, an undisguised expression ma-
nipulation procedure has been found to predict equally suc-
cessfully people’s response to other, disguised
self-perception tasks. For example, Laird et al. (1994) ob-
served individual differences in the tendency for people to
mimic facial expressions. Whether people mimicked was
predicted by their response to the undisguised expression
manipulation procedure. People who were identified as re-
sponsive to self-produced cues also were more likely to
spontaneously mimic. In a second study, participants were
prevented from mimicking while watching a happy, humor-
ous movie. People responsive to personal cues enjoyed the
movie less when prevented from mimicking, whereas peo-
ple unresponsive to personal cues were unaffected. Note
that although the participants were fully aware of the ex-
pression manipulation procedure, they were entirely blind
to the nature and purpose of the manipulations of mimicry
in the second study, and had no idea that their behavior was
being observed in the first study. Thus, these results could
not have been mediated by participant awareness of the ex-
pectations of the experimenters. Because this undisguised
procedure works adequately, and requires much less decep-
tion, we employed the undisguised version in this study.
First, participants were told that some people feel happier
when they are smiling, and angrier when frowning;
whereas other people do not feel anything at all, that both
ways of responding are equally common, and that neither is
better than the other. Then participants were asked to close
their eyes and adopt the facial expression of a smile and to
notice how they were feeling when doing it. When they felt
they had identified their feelings, they reported them on
emotion rating scales. Then participants were given the
same instructions for adopting a frown for several seconds
and describing their emotions. The mood rating scale for
both facial expressions consisted of 8 items including the
target emotions, angry and happy, rated on a 15 cm linear
scale labeled didn’t feel at all at the one end and felt very
strongly at the other. Further items were sad, afraid, dis-
gusted, anxious, surprised, and interested. Participants
were asked to make a slash through the line to represent
their feelings at the moment of producing the smile (or the
frown, respectively). This procedure was repeated for both
facial expressions, so that each individual provided four
expression manipulations score. The happy scores for the
frown trials were subtracted from the happy scores for the
smile trials, and the anger scores for the smile trials were
subtracted from the anger scores for the frown trials, and
these scores were combined, yielding a total score that
could range between + 40 and –40. The resulting scores
were increasingly positive if the participants’ feelings were
consistent with their facial expressions, and negative if
their feelings were inconsistent.
Following previous practice (e.g., Laird et al., 1994) the
participants were divided into two groups on the basis of their
expression manipulation scores. Participants whose expres-
sion manipulation scores were greater than 10 on both trials
wereassigned to thePersonalCuegroup,whereas thosewhose
scores were below 10 on either trial were assigned to the
non-Personal Cue, Situational Cue group.
Finally, at the conclusion of the experiment, a
postexperimental questionnaire was given to determine if
the participants had identified the purpose of the study.
None of the women reported any suspicions that the study
was directed specifically at PMS as opposed to other fac-
tors that affect mood.
Results
Each woman had provided approximately 480 data points,
consisting of the eight mood descriptors for each of 60 days.
As a first step in the analysis, multivariate analysis of vari-
ances (MANOVAs) were conducted on each woman’s data
separately, comparing her mood ratings of days during her
premenstrual weeks with days during the other weeks, with
each of the approximately 60 days serving as an observa-
tion.4 The multivariate F ratios were significant for 9 of the
participants, with the F ratios ranging between F(8, 53) =
3.96, p < .001, η2 = .37 and F(8, 49) = 2.03, p < .05, η2 = .25.
No mood variables were significantly associated with men-
strual cycle for 6 of the women, with F ratios ranging be-
tween F(8, 49) = 1.91, p = .08, η2 = .24 and F(8, 53) = 0.65, p
= .73, η2 = .09.
To assess the relationship between Cue Response and
PMS, we compared the Personal Cue and Situational Cue
groups on the size of their PMS effect, as measured by η2,
in each participant’s individual analyses comparing
Premenstrual and non-Premenstrual days. As predicted, the
Personal Cue group had a higher mean multivariate η2 for
PMS (M = 0.22, SD = 0.10), than the Situational Cue group
(M = 0.12, SD = 0.02). Because the variances of the two
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4Initial analyses revealed no differences between menstrual and
intermenstrual weeks, so for subsequent analyses these two were collapsed
and compared with the premenstrual weeks.
groups were significantly different, by Levine’s test, we
tested this difference with a t test that did not assume simi-
lar variances. The result was significant, t(6.9) = 2.59, p =
.036, η2 = .33. In sum, women who were more responsive
to personal cues were significantly more likely to show
substantial changes in their mood associated with their
menstrual cycle.
Although the overall results were just what we had an-
ticipated, the specific patterns were much more complex
than the usual conceptions of menstrual cycle-related mood
changes. Four of the women showed significant changes in
mood that were consistent with usual conceptions of PMS;
for example, significantly higher anxiety, anger, or sadness.
Four showed significant positive mood changes, such as
greater energy and happiness, during the premenstrual
week. For each of the women who showed significant cycle
effects, the mean differences between moods during
premenstrual periods and moods at other times are pre-
sented in Table 1. Note that only the differences associated
with significant effects are presented, for clarity, because
the purpose of this table is to display the quite different pat-
terns of response.
The particular patterns of association between mood and
cycle varied widely among individual women. In addition
to the fact that some women changed positively although
others changed negatively, within these two groups the
women also reacted quite differently. For example, in the
conventional, negative mood group, one woman showed
significant changes only in sadness, another only in anxi-
ety, and a third only in reduced positive moods, whereas
another showed very general increases in most negative
moods and decreases in positive. Although PMS seems to
be real, these differences in response suggest PMS takes
many forms, including sometimes positive changes. Our as-
sumption, however, was that changes in a single mood
item, if significant, represented an important change in a
woman’s life experience.
A second predictor of menstrual cycle mood effect was
discovered unexpectedly. To see if each woman’s array of
emotion ratings could be simplified, we performed factor
analyses of each woman’s data over the 60 plus days she
reported. These factor analyses revealed that the women
differed substantially in the number of factors with eigen
values above 1 that were extracted. The largest number of
factors was 4, and the lowest was 1. The number of factors
extracted in this fashion has been used by Larsen and Cut-
ler (1996) as a measure of individual differences in emo-
tional complexity.
Women who experienced premenstrual changes, either
positive or negative, had a significantly higher number of
emotion factors extracted (M = 2.60, SD = 0.52) compared
with women who did not experience premenstrual changes
(M = 1.82, SD = 0.75), t(11) = 2.34, p = .04, η2 = .37. It ap-
pears, then, that women whose emotional lives are more
complex are more prone to mood changes, for better or
worse, due to their menstrual cycle.
Response to personal or situational cues was not related
to the number of factors extracted, t(12) = 0.84, p = .41, η2
= .07.
Discussion
The daily measurements of mood demonstrated that some,
but not all, women experienced mood effects associated with
their menstrual cycle. The observation that 4 women felt
more positively during their premenstrual week is inconsis-
tent with broad cultural stereotypes about PMS, but in fact
similar findings have been reported previously. Nichols
(1995) found that a considerable percentage of her partici-
pants reported they usually or occasionally experienced posi-
tive premenstrual changes, a finding echoed by a number of
others (e.g., Blumenthal & Nadelson, 1988; Chrisler,
Johnston, Champagne, & Preston, 1994; Hamilton et al.,
1984; Parlee, 1982).
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TABLE 1
Significant Changes in Emotion Ratings from Nonpremenstrual to Premenstrual Periods for
Participants Showing Negative and Positive Changes
Ratings
Subject No. Angry Irritable Anxious Confused Sad Depressed Energetic Happy
7 1.78 1.09
12 –0.72 –0.94
13 1.01 1.30 0.70 0.63 –2.41 –1.74
19 1.05
8 –1.20 –1.09
9 –1.51 –0.55 0.93
16 1.70
18 –1.51 –3.80 –1.68 –2.22 –1.33 2.22 3.35
Note. No data are presented for the group whose moods did not differ with their cycle. All change scores
presented were significantly different at p < .05.
Both the positive and the negative menstrual changes ap-
pear to reflect self-perception processes, because the women
whoshowedthesechangesweremuchmore responsive toper-
sonal cues. Women who showed no menstrual cycle effects
were relatively unaffected by the expression manipulation
procedures. These results suggest that the experience of PMS
may depend on a general sensitivity to bodily cues, which are
interpreted as emotional.
The relation between emotional complexity and PMS
was not anticipated, but is not entirely surprising. In one
study, people who were more emotionally complex were
also more responsive to personal cues (Pelusi, Schnall,
Abrahamson, Laird, & Flack, 1997). Although the relation
between complexity and response to personal cues was not
significant here, the reason may have been the very small
number of participants. In the earlier study, more complex
people also scored higher on a measure of emotional intelli-
gence (Pelusi et al., 1997). These results suggest that using
personal cues is more complex than using situational cues
alone. The same conclusion is implied by the observation
that people who are more responsive to personal cues are
also more field independent (Duncan & Laird, 1977;
Edelman, 1984). This cluster of findings suggests that some
people are more “emotionally complex,” and score higher
on emotional intelligence, and their emotional feelings are
also more likely to be based on personal cues. Although
this array of qualities seems to be desirable, emotional
complexity and response to personal cues also appear to
carry with them an increased susceptibility to PMS.
Of course, the number of women in the final sample was
small and raises concerns, for two reasons. One was that we
need to be cautious in drawing conclusions from such small
groups. Study 2 employed a quite different design that per-
mitted us to study much larger numbers. The second reason
for caution was that we have to be concerned about the ef-
fects of self-selection on our sample. Those who completed
this study and those who dropped out did not differ on any
of the characteristics we had measured, but of course they
could have differed on any number of others. However, be-
cause the cue–response comparisons were all within the
group who completed this study, there does not seem to be
any way that these results could have been due to this
self-selection. The only question might be whether we can
generalize these results to a broader population. For exam-
ple, the proportions of our sample women who showed pos-
itive and negative effects of their cycle might be quite
different from the general population.
We have interpreted the results of Study 1 as reflecting
differences in how responsive women with and without
PMS were to personal, bodily cues. Implicit in this inter-
pretation is the assumption that the bodily states were the
same, and the differences lay in how they were used to con-
struct emotional experiences. That interpretation is consis-
tent with many previous self-perception studies, in which
bodily states were manipulated and necessarily were the
same for both personal and situational groups, and
differences in feelings must have arisen from differences in
constructive processes. However, differences between the
personal and situational groups in constructive processes do
not rule out differences in actual bodily processes as well.
The results of Study 1 could have reflected real differences
in bodily reactions due to the menstrual cycle. Study 2 di-
rectly examines the question of the role of constructive, in-
terpretative processes.
STUDY 2
In the self-perception interpretation of PMS, at least three
conditions would be required to produce emotional effects in
a woman:
1. Her body must be providing appropriate physi-
cal cues.
2. She must be responsive to those cues.
3. The cues must not be attributable to some
nonemotional source, including her cycle.
In our first study, we explored the impact of the first two
factors, and in the second study we added the third factor.
The general procedure was adopted from Schwarz and
Clore (1983) who examined the effects of external factors,
such as the weather, on moods and life satisfaction. They
found that as long as the weather was not made salient,
people reported more negative moods if the weather was
bad. However, simply asking about the weather before ob-
taining the mood and satisfaction measures was sufficient
to dispel weather effects. Apparently, when reminded that
the weather may bias their judgment, the respondents dis-
counted those influences on their mood and reported higher
life satisfaction and happiness. In our second study, we
used a very similar experimental procedure, except that the
factor that was made salient, or not, was the menstrual cy-
cle. Women were asked two questions that highlighted their
current stage of their cycle. The experimental manipulation
consisted of whether these questions were asked before or
after they reported their current mood and life satisfaction.
In accordance with the self-perception approach to PMS,
we expected that women would be more likely to mistake
premenstrual bodily changes for emotions and experience
negative emotions if they were, first of all, responsive to
personal cues, and second, not aware of being in the
premenstrual phase of their cycle. Reminding them of their
premenstrual status was expected to diminish PMS, as a
kind of discounting effect. Both effects should only occur
for women who were responsive to personal cues. In con-
trast, we expected that women who were more responsive
to situational cues would be relatively unaffected by their
menstrual cycle, and by the reminder.
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Method
Participants
The participants were 149 undergraduate volunteers, re-
cruited from an introductory psychology class. To not reveal
the purpose of this study, all students in the class were asked to
fill out a questionnaire, but only the data of the female partici-
pants were analyzed. The data of 20 women were excluded be-
cause they had either only filled out part of the questionnaire,
or they were unable to predict their next period.
Procedure
Following a class lecture, participants were asked to volun-
teer to stay in the classroom and to fill out a questionnaire
describing their emotional feelings and their life satisfac-
tion. No identifying information was requested on the ques-
tionnaire, and students were seated with sufficient spacing
so their responses were not readily observable by others.
Each questionnaire consisted of two pages: On one page,
the emotion rating scale, participants were asked to rate 9
mood adjectives (angry, happy, anxious, relaxed, sad, de-
pressed, irritable, confused, tense) on 12 cm long rating
scales by making a slash on the line that represented their
momentary feelings. The end points of these scales were la-
beled didn’t feel at all and felt very strongly. These brief
scales were adapted from Plutchik (1980) and have been
used to accurately identify emotional changes in the elderly
(Plutchik, McCarthy, & Hall, 1975) and in college students
(Duclos et al., 1989; Plutchik, 1965), as well as in many
other self-perception studies (Laird & Bresler, 1992). Par-
ticipants also rated how satisfied they were with their life,
from not satisfied at all to very satisfied. All scales were
scored by measuring from the didn’t feel at all end, yielding
raw scores that could range from 0 to 17. Means and stan-
dard deviations of these scores appear in Table 2, and
intercorrelations in Table 3.
The other page contained the questions to establish
where the women were in their menstrual cycle. Although
we wanted participants to be aware of their stage of the
menstrual cycle, we did not want them to recognize that
this was our research focus. To help conceal that purpose,
men in the class also filled out the materials, and this study
was introduced simply as an exploration of moods during
an ordinary day. In addition to the questions about men-
strual cycle, some distractor questions were included.
These were, “Has anything happened today to affect your
mood to an unusual degree? Can you very briefly describe
the nature of the event, and what effect it had?” and “When
did you last exercise? What did you do?” The critical cycle
questions were (for women) “When did your most recent
menstrual period begin?” and “When do you expect your
next period to begin?”
Theexperimentalmanipulationconsistedofwhichof these
sheets of paper was on top and was responded to first. Giving
the participant the mood rating scale first was the
“unreminded” condition, because they described their feel-
ings before being asked about their cycle. Participants who an-
swered the questions on menstruation, life events, and
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TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Mood and Life Satisfaction
Measures for all Participants
M SD
Depressed 3.49 4.42
Angry 3.59 4.61
Tense 6.74 5.55
Irritated 4.74 5.11
Anxious 8.46 5.30
Sad 4.17 5.11
Relax 7.27 5.15
Happy 10.64 5.40
Confused 5.10 5.07
Change 9.00 4.47
Life 11.20 4.32
TABLE 3
Intercorrelations of Emotional Feeling and Life Satisfaction Variable With Effects of Reminder Condition Removed
Depressed Angry Tense Irritated Anxious Sad Relax Happy Confused Change Life
Depressed .58 .54 .69 .24 .76 –.27 –.55 .56 .22 –.35
Angry .51 .75 .32 .49 –.37 –.40 .34 .10 –.27
Tense .56 .43 .43 –.51 –.43 .40 .14 .14
Irritated .34 .53 –.42 –.49 .38 .20 –.31
Anxious .17 –.40 –.18 .22 .12 –.09
Sad –.26 –.49 .43 .11 –.27
Relax .55 –.25 –.19 .36
Happy –.38 –.18 .46
Confused .22 –.29
Change –.58
Life
Note. r > .227, p < .01.
exercise first were the “reminded” group. Participants were
randomlyassignedtooneof the twoexperimentalconditions.
As part of the packet of materials, after the first two
pages the participants received the instructions and re-
sponse scales for the undisguised expression manipulation
procedure that was described earlier. The major change was
that the instructions were written, but the rating scales and
the scoring procedures were the same.
In this and previous studies using this procedure, the ex-
pression effect scores were skewed in a positive direction
because there is little reason for people to feel strongly op-
posite to the expressions. In this study, the general shape of
the distribution was roughly bimodal, with one mode
slightly above zero, and the other at approximately 15. This
distribution suggests 2 distinct groups, so following previ-
ous research (e.g., Laird et al., 1994), the participants were
divided into 2 groups. The median of the distribution fell in
the “saddle,” at +8, and participants with scores above 8
were assigned to the “Personal Cue group” (N = 76), and
those with scores at or below 8 constituted the “Situational
Cue group” (N = 52).
Women were assigned to one of two groups, depending
on where they were in their cycle on the day of data collec-
tion. Following other researchers (e.g., Rubinow et al.,
1984), and Study 1, premenstrual was defined as the 7 days
preceding expected menstruation. Women in this phase (N
= 33) were compared with the women in all other phases of
their cycle (N = 95).
Results
The basic form of this study included three independent vari-
ables: Cycle Stage, Cue Response group, and Reminder con-
dition; and the predictions are, in effect, of three-way interac-
tions. Specifically, we expected that in the Unreminded
condition, women who were responsive to Personal Cues and
were in their premenstrual week, would report more negative
feelings and less positive feelings than women not in their
premenstrual week, whereas women who were unresponsive
to Personal Cues would not differ as a function of where they
were in their menstrual cycle. The Reminder condition was
expected to reduce negative feelings and increase positive
feelings in women who were premenstrual and responsive to
Personal Cues, relative to the women who were not
premenstrual. The effects of the Reminder on Personal Cue
women who were not premenstrual was expected to be more
complex. In at least two studies, people more responsive to
personal cues have been found to use cultural and situational
expectations about how they would be expected to feel as
comparison standards, and as a consequence have produced
mood effects that were opposite to the situational expecta-
tions. In one study, this led to a “reverse” placebo effect
(Duncan & Laird, 1980), and in another to a negative impact
on self-esteem because of comparison with a positive stan-
dard (Wilcox & Laird, 2000). Because of the cultural expec-
tations about mood effects of menstrual cycle and their own
experiences, the Reminder condition was expected to have a
mild contrast effect in the Personal Cue group. As a result,
we expected Personal Cue Reminded participants to report
increased negative and reduced positive feelings.
The expected patterns of relations between Cue Re-
sponse and menstrual status were quite different as a func-
tion of Reminder group, which would produce a three-way
interaction. However, the interaction terms are relatively
weak tests of the predictions of this study (Hays, 1981, p.
414). Consequently, more direct planned two-way analysis
of variances (ANOVAs) that focused on the experimental
predictions were conducted.
The first question was whether the members of the Per-
sonal Cue group were more likely to experience
premenstrual symptoms. Our expectation was that the re-
minder would affect premenstrual symptoms, so the differ-
ences between Personal and Situational Cue groups are
most clearly seen in two-way ANOVAs examining only the
participants in the Unreminded condition. These ANOVAs
were carried out on each of the nine emotion ratings, and
the rating of life satisfaction. For five of the ratings, angry,
irritated, sad, depressed, and tense, there were significant
interactions between cue group and cycle stage. In every
case, in the Situational Cue group the women who were
premenstrual differed relatively little and nonsignificantly
from those who were not premenstrual. However, in the
Personal Cue group, women who were in their
premenstrual week were substantially more angry, irritated,
sad, depressed, and tense than the women in other stages of
their cycle (See Table 4 for means and F ratios for the Cue
Group by Cycle Stage interaction). The women who were
more sensitive to personal cues showed the classic symp-
toms of PMS, whereas the Situational Cue group did not.
The specific prediction in these analyses was for differ-
ences between premenstrual and other conditions in the
Personal Cue group, but no differences in the Situational
Cue group. To ensure that the results presented in Table 2
were not reflecting meaningless differences in the Situa-
tional Cue group, we also performed planned comparisons
testing the specific prediction of no differences in the Situa-
tional Cue group, and greater negative and lesser positive
feelings in the premenstrual, Personal Cue group, in con-
trast to the nonpremenstrual, Personal Cue group. These
comparisons were significant for angry, F(1, 58) = 5.64, p
< .05; depressed, F(1, 58) = 6.28, p < .05; irritable, F(1,
58) = 5.70, p < .05; and tense, F(1, 58) = 13.08, p < .05.
These results parallel quite closely those presented in Table
4, and thus, the results do appear to represent differences in
the impact of menstrual status on the Personal Cue women.
The next question was whether these effects of men-
strual cycle on feelings could be reduced by leading the
women to correctly attribute their bodily states to their be-
ing premenstrual. Because the Situational Cue group had
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shown no evidence of premenstrual tension, the effects of
the reminder on feelings was tested in the Personal Cue
group alone. The effect of Reminder was also examined in
the Situational Cue group in a separate set of analyses.
In the Personal Cue group, the results were as expected.
In general, the women who were premenstrual had the
highest ratings for the negative feelings if they had not been
reminded, and the reminded group had the lowest ratings.
The reminder reduced feelings of depression and tenseness,
and at marginal levels of significance, of anger and irrita-
tion (see Table 5).
In addition, the reminder had a significant effect on ratings
of life satisfaction. The women who were premenstrual and
not reminded were least satisfied with their lives, whereas
when reminded they were most satisfied.
These changes reflect both shifts toward more positive
feelings among Reminded, Premenstrual women, and slight
increases in negative feelings in the Reminded,
Nonpremenstrual women.5
The same analyses were carried out for the Situational
Cue group, but none of the main effects or more important,
the interaction between Cycle and Reminder, were signifi-
cant. Indeed, only two of the interaction Fs exceeded 1.0
(and all Fs < 2.24). Not surprisingly, because this group
had shown no effects of their cycle on their feelings, they
also were unaffected by a reminder about their cycle.
Discussion
This study confirmed the two, mutually supportive predic-
tions of the self-perception theory interpretation of PMS.
First of all, among the women who had not been reminded of
their stage in their menstrual cycle, only those women who
were responsive to personal cues showed effects of their cy-
cle on their mood. This result is of course precisely the same
as that of the first study, although from a quite different per-
spective and method, and with much greater numbers of par-
ticipants. Note that this result is relatively unique in the PMS
literature, where few personality differences between those
who do and do not suffer from PMS have been observed.
Both of these studies indicate that being responsive to bodily
cues increases susceptibility to PMS.
The second set of results supports the misattribution in-
terpretation of the differences between personal and situa-
tional cue groups as well as the misattribution interpretation
of PMS, although these results are certainly less robust.
When these women were reminded of being premenstrual,
the mood differences between stages in their cycle tended
to disappear. Thus, apparently the occurrence of PMS is not
simply a function of the stage of the personal cue woman’s
cycle and the resultant hormonal variations. In addition to
being premenstrual and responsive to personal cues, a
woman must also have available an alternative understand-
ing of her bodily cues. Even knowing that she is
premenstrual is sufficient to reduce the occurrence of PMS,
apparently because she now correctly attributes her bodily
sensations to nonemotional, hormonal influences.
A conceptually similar effect was observed by Rodin
(1976; Study 2), in a study in which women were exposed to
anxiety-producing threats and then asked to perform a number
of cognitive tasks that were sensitive to the disruptive effects
of anxiety. Women who were premenstrual, and reminded of
that fact, were significantly less disrupted by the threats than
were women who were intermenstrual or premenstrual and
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TABLE 4
Ratings of Mood for Personal and Situational Cue Responding Participants in Premenstrual or Other Weeks in Unreminded Condition
Situational Personal
Rating Nonpremenstrual Premenstrual Nonpremenstrual Premenstrual MSE Interaction F p η2
Depressed 4.72 2.70 11.70 5.63 15.29 7.16 .01 .11
Angry 4.75 3.75 2.39 6.63 19.82 4.27 .04 .07
Tense 8.81 6.25 3.70 10.25 20.44 12.58 <.01 .18
Irritated 6.28 4.60 3.91 8.63 24.34 5.20 .03 .08
Anxious 8.75 11.30 8.48 5.63 26.48 3.42 .07 .06
Sad 5.19 3.45 2.39 5.50 17.16 4.23 .04 .07
Relax 6.09 5.95 8.64 5.63 24.26 1.05 .31 .02
Happy 9.53 11.45 11.93 9.31 21.52 2.96 .09 .05
Confused 4.56 7.10 3.86 5.13 23.05 0.22 .64 <.01
Change 7.47 7.75 9.02 9.00 22.70 0.02 .90 .01
Life 12.00 10.75 12.41 9.50 18.86 0.45 .50 <.01
Note. df for all F ratios = 1, 58.
5Because the expectations were for changes, in opposite directions, in
both the Premenstrual and Nonpremenstrual groups as a function of the Re-
minder, the planned-comparison tests of the separate effects did not seem ap-
propriate here. However, they were conducted. The reminder did increase
life satisfaction significantly in the Premenstrual group, F(1, 19) = 4.68, p <
.05, and marginally irritability, F(1, 19) = 3.28, p < .07.
unreminded of that fact. Rodin’s interpretation of these results
was that the arousal produced by the threats was reattributed to
the effects of being premenstrual, and hence was not inter-
preted as disruptive anxiety. The common feature of both Ro-
din’s study and ours is the fact that presumed bodily cues for
unpleasant feelings can be discounted if they are attributed,
correctly in this study or incorrectly in Rodin’s study, to the
menstrual cycle.
In contrast to our finding that awareness of menstrual
cycle reduced reported symptoms, Gallant, Hamilton,
Popiel, Morokoff, and Chakraborty (1991) found that mak-
ing participants aware they were in a study of premenstrual
tension very slightly increased PMS-like symptoms. Per-
haps the difference is that our participants were divided
into those responsive to and unresponsive to personal cues.
When combined, the discounting effects among the per-
sonal cue group might be obscured by the lack of response
among the participants who were low in response to per-
sonal cues. Indeed, in some circumstances people who are
unresponsive to personal cues show positive placebo ef-
fects, endorsing whatever they believe is expected of them
(Duncan & Laird, 1980). Gallant et al.’s (1991) results
might reflect the combined effects of no changes in re-
minded personal cue participants, and a mild placebo effect
in the situational cue group. In fact, among our participants,
the situational cue group showed small, nonsignificant ten-
dencies toward more negative moods when reminded that
they were premenstrual.
Could these results reflect some kind of experimenter
bias? In this study, the women were, of course, explicitly
aware of the nature and purpose of the expression manipu-
lation procedure. However, they could not have used that
knowledge to produce these results, for a number of rea-
sons. First of all, they had all completed the PMS measures
before they encountered the expression manipulation proce-
dure. Because any one woman only experienced one of the
reminder conditions, and could not have known that others
were receiving a different order of measures, she could not
have known how to respond. Finally, it would have been
very unlikely to discern the complex pattern of predictions,
to know how they should respond.
In sum, the pattern of results was quite complex, and
followed very precisely the predictions of the self-percep-
tion model of PMS, and confirmed the results of Study 1
with a much larger sample.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Both studies provide consistent evidence that premenstrual
mood changes may be the result of normal self-perception
processes that ordinarily lead to veridical experiences of
emotion. In both Study 1 and Study 2, only those women
who were identified as more responsive to personal cues
showed significant associations between their cycle and
their moods. The two studies employed quite different
methodologies, with compensating strengths and weak-
nesses, so the convergence of their results is particularly
powerful. The individual difference variable that predicts
PMS in both studies is derived from—and indeed central
to—self-perception theory. The basic prediction that guided
both studies, that response to personal cues would predict
the occurrence of PMS, seems unlikely to have been de-
rived from any other perspective. Consequently, the results
of these two studies suggest that a self-perception approach
to PMS may be productive.
The first requirement for the occurrence of PMS seems
to be that a woman has to be responsive to her bodily states
and responses. Consistent with this view, a quite different
line of research also indicates that women who are more in
touch with their bodily cues are more likely to experience
premenstrual mood changes: Women who experience PMS
also judge pain stimuli as more aversive than women who
do not show PMS (Kuczmierczyk et al., 1986). In a recent
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TABLE 5
Effects of the Reminder on Personal Cue Participants Who are in Their Premenstrual or Other Weeks
Nonpremenstrual Premenstrual
Rating Unreminded Reminded Unreminded Reminded MSE Interaction F p η 2
Depressed 1.70 4.59 5.63 4.04 18.91 3.69 .06 .05
Angry 2.39 3.58 6.63 3.64 21.87 2.80 .10 .04
Tense 3.70 7.02 10.25 6.95 24.39 6.27 .02 .08
Irritated 3.91 4.50 8.63 4.45 24.70 3.21 .08 .04
Anxious 8.48 8.40 5.63 8.41 26.11 1.10 .30 .02
Sad 2.39 4.34 5.50 6.41 19.64 0.19 .66 <.01
Relax 8.64 7.84 5.63 8.77 28.86 1.89 .17 .03
Happy 11.93 10.67 9.31 11.09 24.37 1.32 .25 .02
Confused 3.86 5.67 5.13 5.64 26.49 0.27 .64 <.01
Change 9.02 10.27 9.00 6.50 19.42 2.54 .12 .03
Life 12.41 10.93 9.50 13.41 16.74 6.06 .02 .08
Note. df for all F ratios = 1, 72.
study (Genov, Pietrzak, Bemis, & Fortunato, 1999) we also
found that people who were more responsive to personal
cues, as measured by the same procedure as reported in this
article, demonstrated greater pain detection sensitivity and
lower pain tolerance. Responding to personal cues seems to
have some cost, in increased sensitivity to pain, and greater
propensity for PMS.
An alternative possibility is that women who are more
responsive to personal cues also have different hormonal or
other bodily responses. In this case, susceptibility to PMS
would not be due to how one perceives the bodily states,
but in the nature of those states themselves. However, the
effects of the reminder manipulation in Study 2 argue
against this possibility. Participants were randomly as-
signed to the reminded or unreminded conditions, so we
must assume that among the personal cue group actual hor-
monal and bodily states were the same. However, the re-
minder that changed how these bodily states were
interpreted was sufficient to prevent the emotional feelings
of PMS. Of course, the possibility remains that personal
and situational cue women do differ in their physiology, but
this physiology must in its turn lead to feelings through a
process that is susceptible to the discounting effect.
In sum, the results of these two studies suggest that to
experience PMS, a woman must be responsive to personal
cues from her body, and not have available some alterna-
tive, nonemotional interpretation of these cues (including
the correct recognition that they are due to monthly hor-
monal fluctuations). In these studies we have only assumed
the presence of the third necessary condition, the bodily
states. Indeed, in the current state of knowledge, it would
have been difficult to assess the existence of these cues, be-
cause no one seems to be quite sure what they might be.
There is ample evidence that these bodily states are pro-
duced during and by a woman’s menstrual cycle, and that
they have effects beyond those produced simply by expec-
tations (Klebanov & Jemmott, 1992; Olasov & Jackson,
1987). They probably have something to do with the rise
and fall of progesterone, estrogen, or some related hormone
(Schmidt et al., 1998). However, whatever these bodily
changes turn out to be, they appear to work their emotional
effects at least in part through the medium of self-percep-
tion processes. That is, hormones are involved in producing
emotional feelings because of the way in which the hor-
monal effects are interpreted and experienced.
The menstrual cycle produces a wide variety of emotional
effects, and in Study 1 these effects were specific to particular
individuals: Some women were sad, others anxious, others ir-
ritable, and some even happy. At the moment, it is unclear
what factors lead to one or another emotional response. One
possibility is that the effects of hormonal changes are rela-
tively unspecific, perhaps producing something like changes
in sympathetic arousal symptoms. Many studies have shown
that arousal is an ambiguous cue that contributes to the experi-
ence of many (though not all) emotions. It may even be “trans-
ferred” fromoneemotion toanother (Zillman,1983).Perhaps,
then, the hormonal cycle exaggerates a woman’s most com-
mon emotion, or perhaps only the emotion that is most domi-
nant in that era of her life. We do not, in fact, even know
whether the effects of menstrual cycle are constant for each
woman. It may be, for example, that a woman who is suscepti-
ble to menstrual cycle mood changes will experience a sad
mood for 1 or 2 months, and then shift to a happy response a
few months later.
The variety of emotional responses that are associated
with the menstrual cycle seem very likely to have contrib-
uted to the uncertainty about the reality of PMS that has
haunted previous research. Particularly if one looks at ag-
gregate data from many women, the real distress of some
would be lost among the experiences of those who re-
sponded positively or not at all.
Although cognitive, attributional factors seem to play an
important role in the experience of PMS, it is crucial to em-
phasize that PMS is not just in the woman’s head. Those
attributional processes are based on real experiences, of
real bodily changes. We do not intend to suggest for a mo-
ment that women mistakenly experience PMS, or that PMS
provides a convenient way of explaining away negative
emotions, such as anger or irritability, that may be consid-
ered inappropriate and inconsistent with the stereotype of
women as generally agreeable and well-behaved. Rather,
we propose that for the multiple reasons discussed previ-
ously, some women do indeed experience mood changes
related to their menstrual cycle, and denying those women
the reality of their emotional feelings could just as much be
seen as an oppressive means of social control of women, as
is sometimes suggested for the construction of the phenom-
enon of PMS itself (cf. Walker, 1995).
The implications of these studies for the potential under-
standing of PMS are certainly the most important. How-
ever, the results bear on self-perception theory as well.
Establishing a connection between laboratory effects and
the emotional life of people in the real world is probably
the strongest kind of support for any theory of emotions.
The self-perception processes that generate emotional expe-
rience have been demonstrated many, many times in the
laboratory. In the two studies of PMS reported here, we
have seen evidence of comparable processes in the every-
day emotional lives of women.
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